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Friedrich Nietzsche cautioned "Stare not into the Abyss, lest the Abyss stare back 
at you." In light of the "war on terrorism" and real threats to national security, the 
satellite community is faced with few choices but to reorganize and refocus. 
Problems that for decades plagued the nation's critical infrastructure now haunt 
the work of scientists and technicians that design, manufacture and implement the 
equipment supporting satellites. The increased importance of these networked 
systems has been neglected. 
Intelligence on terrorist networks and their interest in destabilizing the economies 
of the Western world have not been matched by increased understanding of how 
they might cripple our communication networks. Efforts to enhance intelligence 
gathering and the government's need to regulate the security of commercial and 
privately owned assets have raised difficult questions. Balancing the genuine 
needs of national security and the protection of corporate liberties so rooted in 
democratic traditions will strain industry resources during the 21st century. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report in October 2002 warning 
that the nation's commercial satellites have been largely ignored in discussions of 
critical infrastructure protection and are vulnerable to attack from hackers. Amid 
heightened concerns about security is the knowledge that space-based 
communication platforms are also at risk. Terrorists just might divert their current 
preoccupation with the aviation industry to attempting to bring down our 
communications networks. 
The GAO report entitled "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite 
Security Should Be More Fully Addressed," was completed in August 2002. It 
found critical vulnerabilities in the nation's commercial satellite network and 
suggested that federal agencies using commercial satellites may be exposing 
sensitive data to unauthorized intrusion. The infiltration or destruction of 
commercial satellites would literally bring the economy of the world to a 
screeching halt. More than a year has passed and little has been accomplished. 
Westerners simply take the system for granted. The nation has been riveted by the 
more publicized threat to aviation. 
A previous editor to the Online Journal of Space Communication wrote, "Our 21st 
Century global economy has its strengths and weaknesses. Positively speaking, 
we have the technology and know-how to do almost anything. Limitations are 
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primarily in terms of economics, politics, societal factors, and education." The 
dangers and realities of terrorism, however, dampen the bright future that 
technology can offer with the grim prospect of destruction of parts of the system 
or even worse the whole array. 
Despite using encryption to shield communications and physical security to 
harden ground stations, federal agencies depend on commercial satellite service 
providers to make available security for tracking, telemetry and control links, 
satellites and satellite control stations. However, those procedures fall well short 
of the standards the government uses to secure the military and intelligence 
satellite network and satellites used in its Global Positioning System. 
Federal laws governing satellite system security apply only to satellites used for 
national security. As a result, government agencies cannot impose specific 
security requirements on satellite service providers whose equipment is used for 
other purposes. Sometimes, those commercial entities see issues of security as 
those that belong on the bottom of the budgetary "to do" list. 
The GAO report notes the increased importance of satellite communications to 
the nation's information infrastructure, and the increasing dependence of the 
federal government on commercial satellites. Traffic from federal agencies 
already makes up a significant amount of traffic handled by commercial satellites, 
and up to 45% of all federal government traffic between the Persian Gulf region 
and the U.S. is carried over commercial satellite networks. The report 
recommends expanding the current federal policy governing satellite security to 
cover commercial satellites used by government agencies. 
It also recommends practical ways to better secure commercial satellite 
communications, such as scrambling telemetry tracking and control 
communications using cryptography or spread spectrum communications, 
improving the security of satellites with attack-resistant components, ensuring 
redundancy in communications networks to guard against the loss of one or more 
satellites and better securing ground stations. Clearly, the nation's policymakers 
and industry professionals should take a close look at the findings and consider 
including commercial satellites as part of the nation's critical infrastructure. 
This issue of the Online Journal of Space Communication focuses on matters 
related to the security of these systems, the laws pertaining to them, the 
weaponization of space and the potential for infiltration of current systems. 
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